Comparing Fordist Cities: The Logic of Urban Crisis and Union Response in Turin, 1950-1975, and Detroit, 1915-1945

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Building on a CES project that compared Turin and Detroit, the dominant automobile-producing cities of Italy and the United States, Ted Perlmutter compares the urban problems of the two cities and the response of the autoworkers' unions to them. He shows that, in automobile cities, unions are unusually responsive to the grievances of those with least power, the unskilled and immigrant laborers, both inside and outside the factory. By comparing Detroit with Chicago and Los Angeles and Turin with Milan, he outlines the singular character of union strategies and urban development to be found in cities dominated by automobile production. Perlmutter provides a wide-ranging and insightful examination of the linkages between shop-floor unions and urban politics more generally.

> "Society does not pose for itself questions, the conditions for whose resolution do not already exist."[1]

As cities of the automobile industry, Detroit and Turin have provided much of the radical iconography of their respective countries. This radical image has primarily developed out of mobilization inside the factory and has obscured the importance of conflicts in the community. This has been as true of activists as it has been of analysts. Many have focused their energy on the factory to the exclusion of the city. As one young radical in the 1970s described the attraction of Turin:

> In Turin, everything appeared at first sight more simply and it seemed the totality of political problems could be directly observed in the conditions and the actions of the workers. I had the sensation of finally being able to engage that which interested me the most, the factory, without the bother of having to think about all the rest.[2]

The most renowned events were the sit-down strikes in the 1930s in Detroit, and the strikes and marches inside the factories during the hot autumn in 1969 in Turin.[3] These events led to and symbolized the national rise of industrial unions. However, urban disruptions also accompanied the rise of the automobile industry. In Detroit in 1943, there were racial conflicts when blacks sought to move into public housing and a race riot that took twenty-five lives. In Turin, there was a violent demonstration over the need for housing in July of 1969, and the massive occupations of public housing that

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[1]Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, pp. 409-410. This is Gramsci's reformulation from memory of Karl Marx's observation "Therefore mankind only sets such tasks as it can solve". Karl Marx, Preface to *Contribution to a Critique of the Philosophy of Right.* Antonio Gramsci, "Americanismo e Fordismo", *Quaderni di Carcere*, Vallentino Gerratura (ed.), Turin, Einaudi, 1975, p. 855.

[2]Pietro Marcenaro and Vittorio Foa, *Riprendere Tempo: Un dialogo con postilla*, Turin, Einaudi, 1982, p.14

[3]A recent example of such celebration of the struggles inside the factory can be seen in the interviews with workers collected in Gabrielle Polo, *I tamburi di Mirafiori: Testamonianze operaie attorno all'autunno caldo alla FIAT* (Turin: Cric Editore, 1990)

occurred throughout the early 1970s and peaked in 1974. The conflicts over housing, service costs, and urban plans were fiery and dramatic.[4]

These cities have produced not only social volatility but also political responsiveness on the part of trade unions that sought to organize in these cities. The argument that this paper proposes to advance is that in automobile cities, unions are particularly responsive to the grievances of those with least power, that is the immigrants and unskilled labor (categories which in Turin and Detroit overlap) in grievances both inside the factory, and more importantly outside.

The methodological approach involves combining Mill's method of agreement with his method of difference. The method of agreement, which reads causal significance out of antecedent conditions, will be used to specify why in Turin and Detroit unions are responsive to these immigrant constituencies. The method of difference, which shows how the lack of a specific antecedent conditions fails to produce the specified outcome, will be used to show how unique the Detroit and Turinese outcomes are within their respective countries. By comparing Detroit with Chicago and Los Angeles, the paper will demonstrate how anomalous is the class-based pattern of interest representation by unions in Detroit. By comparing Turin with Milan, the paper will show how anomalous is the process of urban development in which factories and urban ghettos are part of the fabric of the city in Turin.[5]

As the examples of disruption provided above suggest, the development of automobile cities in Italy and the United States did not occur synchronically. The most

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[4]For an analysis of these protests, see my dissertation "Intellectuals and Urban Protest: Extraparliamentary Politics in Turin, 1968-1976, Harvard University, 1988.

[5]On Mill's method see, John Stuart Mill, *Philosophy of Scientific Method*, New York, Hafner, 1974, pp. 211-233. For concise discussions on using these two methods in synthesis, see Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 36, and Charles Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*, Berkeley, University of California Press, pp. 36-39.

appropriate comparison of urban development patterns is not between the 1960s in both countries, but between Detroit in the 1930s and 1940s, and Turin in the 1960s and 1970s. This was the "social time" of immigration, industrial decentralization, and the slow depopulation of the center city.[6] It was also the period when unions organized the factories in the face of employer resistance and paternalism.[7]

By comparing Detroit and Turin as prototypic forms of the Fordist city, I will show how a massive industry produces distinctive tendencies in urban and political development.[8] In brief, it can be said that Detroit and Turin converged towards an American form of urban development and an Italian pattern of political representation. Norman Fainstein and Susan Fainstein described the difference in urban form as follows:

> Until midway in the last decade, two metaphors captured the physical contrast between major European and American cities: a shallow bowl and a doughnut. European metropolises displayed a preserved historic center, serving expensive consumption, surrounded by high-rise commercial and residential development. The American city, in contrast, revealed a partially abandoned, desolate core, dominated by low-income, minority populations threatening an increasingly beleaguered central business district.[9]

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[6]The term "social time" was first used by Ira Katznelson to describe critical periods when the fundamental character of ethnic relations were determined. For his discussion see, *Black Men, White cities: Race, Politics, and Migration in the United States, 1900-30, and Britain, 1948-68*, Chicago, University of Chicago, 1973, p. 28.

[7]During this original period of worker mobilization, unions are more prominent than parties in carrying out these functions. On the history of the relations between unions and Italian Communist Party (PCI) in Turin, see Steve Hellman, "A New Style of Governing: Italian Communism and the Dilemmas of Transition in Turin, 1975-1979", *Studies in Political Economy*, Autumn 1979, pp. 159-197, and *Italian Communism in Transition: The Rise and Fall of the Historic Compromise in Turin*, New York, Oxford, 1988.

[8]Fordism is industrial mass production based on the assembly line in large factories. A Fordist city is simply one dominated by this mode of production. For a brief description of its rise, Charles Sable, *Work and Politics: The Division of Labor in Industry*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 32-34. For a similar usage, see Danielle Bleitrach et Alain Chenu, *L'Usine e la Vie: Luttes Regionales: Marseille et Fos*, Paris, Maspero, 1979. On the specific ramifications of Fordist developments in Turin, see Arnaldo Bagnasco, *Torino: Un profilo sociologico*, pp. 22-26.

[9]Norman I. Fainstein and Susan S. Fainstein, "Restructuring the American City: A Comparative Perspective" in Fainstein and Fainstein, *Urban Policy under Capitalism*, London, Sage, 1982, p. 161.

Turin's development converges with Detroit, which is one of the most extreme examples in the United States of suburbanization. Unlike most Italian cities, the downtown area had neither a core residential nor commercial district.

The "European" dimension to the mode of interest articulation in Detroit regards unions' abilities to represent general class demands. In other cities in the U.S., unions and parties accommodated to more pluralist or voluntarist modes of interest articulation; in Detroit, there was at the time of union mobilization and there remains today, albeit in an increasingly attenuated form, a tendency to broach broad demands and to reach out to new constituencies. Even within Italy, where class modes of interest articulation are more widespread, the class consciousness and the belief in the factory as a radicalizing influence [*centralità della fabbrica*] of the Turinese unions distinguishes them from other areas of the country.[10]

Automobile cities are of interest for comparative purposes because they are not limited to Turin and Detroit. In Germany (Wolfsburg-Hannover), Spain (Cordoba), Japan (Toyota City), as well as in Detroit and Turin, the automotive industry has been the dominant industry in a single city.[11]

Two sets of similarities make the Italian-American comparison particularly compelling. First, the relations between local and national political authorities are such

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[10]For the classic description of the ideology of Turinese workers, see Aris Accornero "Come si riproduce un'avanguardia" in Aris Accornero and Vittorio Rieser *Il mestiere dell'avanguardia* Riedizione di "FIAT Confino", Bari, De Donato, 1981 and Miriam Golden, "Historical Memory and Ideological Orientations in the Italian Workers' Movement", *Politics and Society*, 16(1), 1-34. For an analysis of the actual effects of this consciousness on union policy, see Miriam Golden, *Labor Divided : Austerity And Working-class Politics In Contemporary Italy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.

[11]In other cases, automobile cities have grown up on the peripheries of major cities or in specific regions. Other areas where in the late 1950s and 1960s more than 50% of a nation's automobile production falls within the bounds of a given locality would include England (the Southeast and West Midlands), France (the Parisian Region), the Soviet Union (Togliattigrad) , and Brazil (San Paolo). Maria Rita Andreola et. al., *Spazio e Potere: Differeniziali territoriali e divisione internazionale della produzione*, Florence, CLUSF, 1978, p. 156.

that cities can develop their own local plans and respond diversely to national initiatives.[12] These differences between local contexts are sufficient to make meaningful contrasts between cities in the same country. Second, in Turin as well as Detroit, the workers who came to take semi-skilled and unskilled jobs in the plants were Southern migrants.[13] They did so as citizens who would become members of unions and political parties. In this respect, they differed from European countries, such as France and Germany, which imported unskilled labor from less-developed countries. When economic times turned less favorable, these countries could encourage or force their repatriation.[14] In the United States and Italy, these rights of political citizenship reinforced the migrants' militancy and increased the unions' and the political parties' interests in mobilizing and representing them.

A Detroit-Turin Model of Automobile Industry Development

The analysis will focus on the pressures that automobile production places on the single industry city. When automobile production is encompassed within a single city, two dominant tendencies emerge. First, the industry is subject to rapid economic

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[12]For an explanation of how much greater is the political autonomy of Italian local officials than the French, see Sidney Tarrow, *Tra Centro e periferia: Il ruolo degli amministratori locali in Italia e in Francia*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1977. Note also the work of Bruno Dente, *Governare la frammentazione; stato, regioni ed enti locali in Italia*, Bolgona, Il Mulino, 1985, and Alberta Sbragia, "Not All Roads Lead to Rome: Local Housing Policy in the Unitary Italian State", *British Journal of Political Science*, 3, IX, 1979.

[13]As shall be argued, there are substantial differences in the hostility between blacks and white in the United States and the hostility between northern and southern Italians. For a provocative argument that "ethnic" differences between the Turinese and the Southern migrants affected conflicts within FIAT, see Alberto Baldissera, "Alle origini della political disugualianza nell'Italia degli anni' 80. La marcia dei quarantamila" *Quaderni di Sociologia*, XXXI, 1984, N. 1, pp. 1-78.

[14]S. Castles and G. Kosak, *L'immigrazione operaie nell aree forti d'Europa*, Torino, Musolini, 1974. On the role of immigrant workers in urban conflicts, see Manuel Castells *et. al., Crise du logement et mouvements sociaux urbains: Enquete sur la region parisienne*, Mouton, Paris, 1974, Chapter 7.

growth, which gives rise to massive immigration which, in turn, puts tremendous stress on housing and social services.[15] This rapid growth encourages unplanned urban development and stimulates social tensions in the city. It also leads private institutions (primarily the auto companies themselves) to create these services. Their efforts at creating these services frequently take a paternalistic turn.

Second, the automobile industry is the natural base for the rise of a broad based, radical unionism. The labor process itself, based on assembly production produces profound alienation and resentment.[16] The employers' combined tactics of paternalism and repression in the pre-unionization period make for a confrontational relationship that tends to spill over into all aspects of civil society. The resonance of these experiences shape the relationship years after unionism has actually arrived. The social processes can be modeled as follows.

Model of Automobile City Effects
on Union Involvement in Urban Politics



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[15]In Turin, during the crucial period between 1963 and 1970, immigration into the city replicated almost exactly the hiring patterns of FIAT, Bagnasco, p. 57.

[16]The standard text on worker alienation is Robert Blauner, *Alienation and Freedom: The Factory Worker and Industry*, Chicago, 1974. As observers such as Kornblum have noted, the automobile industry provides an environment, in contrast to the steel industry, where there are large concentrations of unskilled workers and thus where a militant voice for their demands can be directly projected and heard. William Kornblum, *Blue Collar Community*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1974, p. 125.

The very size of these migrations pressures unions to represent the interests of these newly arrived groups. This rapid increase in the workforce, frequently unskilled and without any traditional union militancy, forces the union to broaden its class constituency and to be tactically innovative. This accommodation produces a more class-oriented labor movement. The difficulties that immigrants experience in confronting the lack of social services also pushes unions to broaden their interests from the factories into the communities as well. Far more than in other cities in their respective countries, unions in Detroit and Turin supported workers' claims outside the factories in local politics. The urban structure pushes unions to these involvements, which then cement alliances with immigrant communities.

These polarizing policies repressed working class organization and limited the rise of interclass institutions. In response to these pressures, and the requisites of organizing a new constituency, the unions organized in ways that meant that they would emerge as the most class conscious, radical, community-oriented unions in their respective countries. The sections that follow elaborate in greater detail the process just described.

Detroit and Turin had similar patterns of growth, depopulation of the center city and industrial decentralization. Both Detroit and Turin were the cities with the greatest concentration of manufacturing in a single industry. In Detroit in 1940, 48% of the city's work force was involved in manufacturing and 31% worked for the automobile industry.[17] In Turin in 1971 80% of industrial employment in 1960 was related to the automobile industry, and 31% of provincial employment was accounted for directly by

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[17]Sergio Conti, *Dopo la Città Industriale: Detroit tra crisi urbana e crisi dell'automobile*, Milan, Franco Angeli, 1983, p 107. In 1968, Detroit still was the most concentrated industrial city in the United States: 39.9% of the workforce in the standard metropolitan area was involved in manufacturing, and 15.9% of the workforce was working directly in the automobile industry. James A. Geschwender, *Class, Race, and Worker Insurgency: The League of Revolutionary Black Workers*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977, p. 58.

FIAT.[18] This concentration has been the product of extremely rapid growth within the industry. The American automobile industry, which produced approximately 4000 automobiles in 1900, produced approximately a million in 1915, and then quadrupled this production within a decade. Similarly, the Italian automobile industry, which produced 118,000 automobiels in 1950, would double its production for each five year period up until 1965.[19]

Detroit's urban growth mirrored the growth of the industry and was accentuated by the demands that the two World Wars put on the city. Between 1900 and 1920, population increased from 360,000 to 1,101,000. During this period, it grew from the 14th to the 6th largest city in the United States.[20]

Two trends transformed the geography of the city. First, during this period neighborhoods became more homogeneous. In his description of the ecological changes in Detroit from 1880-1920, Zunz argues that class emerged as a feature of ethnic groups' residential patterns during this period.

> Class gradually became a salient feature of urban life not because the traditional ethnic matrix for people's lives vanished. Inequality cut deeper into previously cross-class ethnic communities, which became increasingly segmented along class lines until they had to give way.[21]

Second, urban development followed factory growth with a leapfrog logic, expanding out into the suburbs.[22] Factories would move out from the core of the city

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[18]Pierre Gabert, *Turin Ville Industrielle: Etude de géographie économique et humaine*, Paris, Puf, 1964, p. 168, 169.

[19]American figures, which are based on automobile sales are taken from Conti, p. 93. Italian figures are from Emilio Pugno e Sergio Garavini *Gli Anni Duri alla Fiat: La resistenza sindacale e la ripresa.* Einaudi, Torino, 1974, p. 231.

[20]Conti, pp. 110-115.

[21]Olivier Zunz, *The Changing Face of Inequality: Urbanization, Industrial Development, and Immigrants in Detroit, 1880-1920*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982, p. 402.

[22]Robert Sinclair, *The Face of Detroit: A Spatial Synthesis. Detroit:* Wayne State University, Department of Geography, 1972, p. 34. Richard Child Hill, "Crisis in the American City: The Politics of Economic Development in Detroit, *Restructuring the*

along transport lines. They would be followed by related metal-working industries, and then residential growth. The most important factories in this move were the Highland Park plant in 1913, which supported the growth of Highland Park and Hamtramck, and the imposing Ford Rouge plant, which led to the development of Dearborn. Between 1929 and 1940, 335,000 residents moved into the suburbs, while 470,000 moved into the center of the city.[23] This expansion away from the center city was exacerbated by the decisions of the federal government to decentralize, for national security reasons, the new plants built during World War II for defense production.

TURIN AS AMERICAN CITY

Turin had similar patterns of growth, depopulation of the center city and industrial decentralization. From 1959 to 1971, FIAT workers increased from 71,000 to 150,621.[24] The movement of manufacturing in Turin during this period shows the de-industrialization of the city after 1961. As Table 1 shows, the city lost 6.2% of its industry between 1951 and 1961, and 11.4% between 1971 and 1977. At the same time, the two rings of suburbs had more than doubled their share. As a result, [see Table 2] the city's share of the manufacturing base in the Turinese metropolitan area declined from 76.6% in 1961 to 55% in 1977.

[Tables 1 and 2 belong here]

The center of Turin served as the point of first entry for the waves of immigrants that came from the South to work for the automobile industry. On average, about 57,000 people migrated into Turin each year between 1961 and 1967, and 42,000

City: The Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment, New York, Longman, 1983, pp. 87-88.

[23]Detroit Planning Commission, 1946 People of Detroit , p. 51 cited in Sergio Conti, *Dopo la Città Industriale: Detroit tra crisi urbana e crisi dell'automobile*, Milan, Franco Angeli, 1983. This rate of suburbanization was second in the country only to St. Louis.

[24]Data taken from Pugno and Garavini, p. 234.

emigrated, many moving out to the industrial suburbs to be closer to work.[25] A survey of an interior zone in Turin suggests that of the inhabitants in the center of the city in 1962, 31.5% had lived there for less than two years and 70.3% had lived there for less than six years.[26] The central zones of the city remained degraded and overcrowded, despite the fact that they were losing population throughout this period.[27] One of the most central zones of the city lost 20% of its population, while the population of the two belts of suburbs around Turin increased from 245,836 to 364,650 in between 1961 and 1967, an increase of almost 50%.[28] To alleviate these pressures, public housing was built in the peripheral areas of the city. In the south, they were of greatest concentration in "Via Artom" and Mirafiori Sud; in the Northwest in Le Vallette, in the North in La Falchera.[29]

None of these provisions met the demands and need of the city. Lack of schools, hospitals, parks, and most explosively housing led to extensive urban conflicts throughout the period from 1970 to 1976.[30] Turin's American form would mean that conflicts that in the rest of Italy were generally emerged as problems of the urban periphery would be expressed and addressed as conflicts of the city center in Turin.

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[25]The calculations are derived from immigration tables in Filippo Barbano and Franco Garelli, "Struttura e cultura nell'immigrazione. Il caso di Torino", in Filippo Barbano, (ed.) *Strutture della trasformazione Torino 1945-1975*, Turin, Società Piemontese, 1980, p. 130.

[26]Augusto Buscaglia, "Il centro storico di Torino come spazio di relazione degli immigrati", *Città e Società*, Volume 9, No. 2, p. 16.

[27]The three central zones in Turin (Statistical zones 1,2,3) shows a loss of 21% of their population between 1953 and 1970. Analysis computed from data in Clarapede.

[28]This was Zone 1 of the twenty five zones of the city. The overall decline is analyzed from tables in Augusto Buscaglia, "Il centro storico di Torino come spazio di relazione degli immigrati", *Città e Società*, Volume 9, No. 2, 16.

[29]Barbano and Garelli, pp. 207-223.

[30]For the lack of resources, see Osservatorio Urbanistico Regionale Del Piemonte, *Analisi del piano dei servizi, Documento 1*, Turin, 1973, p. 12.

While these patterns are not unusual for American cities, they represent a major break with the pattern of Italian urban development. This ecological pattern differs markedly from other Italian cities where downtown areas are the territory of middle and upper classes, with working class settlements in the hinterlands. This difference can best be seen in comparison with Milan, whose geographic proximity and similar level of economic development make it the most logical pairing with Turin. Where Turin was and is a highly concentrated city based entirely on the automobile industry, Milan had and has a more diverse industrial base, is a major center of financial and commercial development, and is the center of a diffuse regional economy.[31] If in Turin, in 1960, 71% were involved in metalworking, in Milan, the total was about 33%.[32]

Milan experienced less dislocation from the immigration of the 1960s. By then, it already had a highly developed commercial center.[33] When immigrants arrived, the lack of centrally located, low-rent housing forced them to settle immediately in peripheral areas, both within the city's boundaries and beyond, in Milan's suburbs.[34] Also the immigrants who came were easier to accommodate. Whereas in Turin, this immigration was primarily of unskilled workers who came to work at FIAT or in the

[31]Alberto Managhi, Augusto Perelli, Riccardo Sarfatti, Cesare Stevan, *La Città Fabbrica: Contributi per un'analisi di classe del territorio*, Milan, Clup, 1970, p. 102. Gabert, 187. In 1960, the metropolitan area of Milan was over seven times as large as Turin, 4,359.96 as against 729.84 square kilometers, and the population was over three times as large, 4,630,878 inhabitants as against 1,307,560. Table taken from Paolo Ceri, (ed.) *Casa Città e struttura sociale: Indagini sulla produzione della città in Italia*, p. 88.

[32]Turin data is from Gabert, p. 167. Milan data is taken from E. Dalmasso, *Milan Capitale Economique de L'Italie: Etude Geographique*, Paris, Editions Ophrys, 1971, pp. 271, 289. Also published in Italian as *Milano capitale economica d'Italia*, Milan, Franco Angeli, 1972.

[33]As Guido Martinotti describes Milan, this differs somewhat from the pure form described by Fainstein and Fainstein. There are mixed economic zones, hospitals, and local markets that prevent its core from being that of a homogeneously international city. The mixed character of Milan is well captured in Dalmasso, p. 13.

[34]Giovanni Pellicciari, "Persistenza dei flussi d'immigrazione e distribuzione del fenomeno all'interno del triangolo industriale" in Pelliciari, (ed.) *L'Immigrazione nel triangolo industriale*, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1970, p. 279.

other metal-working industry in the city, the immigrants to Milan included those workers who would take positions in the tertiary sector: credit, marketing, and publicity.[35] A comparative analysis by Guido Martinotti argues that the single industry base of Turin has made the accommodation of immigrants more difficult.[36] The difficulty of this transformation for the Turinese is best captured in a quote from Castronuovo.

> In the period after World War II, no Italian city suffered transformations equal to those of Turin. A distant and eccentric province, 'on the periphery of Italy and in the heart of Europe', it became a type of Detroit in its futuristic and anonymous surroundings, and of its advanced industrial society dominated by the mono-culture of the automobile, and at the same time, the third largest Southern city in the country, a community in many ways unknown and incandescent, compressed and violently reborn by the largest immigration in our history.[37]

These rapid and chaotic urban developments opened a space for private institutions to provide the social services that were lacking. These paternalistic developments took place in the absence of unions. While the domination was not as complete as in the classic company towns such as Pullman, the combination of market position and lack of intervening governmental institutions gave the corporations a dominant position.

In Detroit, the height of industrial paternalism occurred in the middle of the 1910s as mass production techniques were introduced and in tandem with a high wage policy. Henry Ford, in 1914, doubled workers' wages to $5 a day through a profit sharing plan. His interest in workers extended beyond the factory into their home lives

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[35]Ibid, p. 278. The poor work 'qualifications' of those who arrived in Turin is also detailed in Gabert, p. 251-254. In any event, FIAT needed a less qualified work force even within the automobile factories than did the Milanese automobile industry. In 1967, 66.3% of the workers were "non-specialized" as opposed to 44% in Milan. Angelo Michelsons, "Turin between Fordism and Flexible Specialization", Ph. D. Dissertation, cited in Bagnasco, p. 39.

[36]Guido Martinotti "L'area metropolitana di Milano: morfologia e strutture sociali", *Prospettiva sindicale*, 55, Anno XVI (March 1985), pp. 17-18.

[37]Valerio Castranuovo, *Il Piemonte*, Turin, Einaudi, p. 697.

as well. Ford sought to fabricate a middle class culture from unruly immigrant habits. He founded a Sociology Department to investigate the home life of workers and scrutinize their moral habits to make sure that they would use this increased salary to good ends. Those judged unworthy were not eligible for the increased salary. Ford and other companies as well sought further to acculturate the immigrants by compulsory education in English. Ford was the most notable but not the only example of this phenomenon. Americanization campaigns were advanced by business oriented civic associations as well as by other companies.[38]

To encourage this domestic tranquility, there was also some experimentation with company sponsored home-building.[39] More common were financial aid and legal assistance for those who wanted to buy a home, frequently with the stipulation that ownership depended on continued employment with the firm. The height of this paternalism ended during World War I when Ford took on a more repressive policy, including espionage, to undermine the incipient labor movement.[40]

In Turin in the 1950s, FIAT's influence and power was seemingly without limit. It successfully dominated the political arena, playing off one Christian Democratic faction against another to find the one that would be most sympathetic to FIAT's vision of the city.[41] It controlled the labor market, offering 31% of the jobs directly to

[38]On acculturation, see David Gartman, *Auto Slavery: The Labor Process in the American Automobile Industry, 1897-1950*, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1986, pp. 225-227. On Americanization campaigns, see Zunz, p. 313.

[39]During this period, Detroit was not overcrowded. Only after the end of World War I, during which little housing was constructed, did housing densities approach the levels in Chicago and New York. Zunz, p. 292.

[40]On home ownership, see David Gartman, *Auto Slavery: The Labor Process in the American Automobile Industry, 1897-1950*, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, p. 221. On the move to more respressive tactics, see Steven Meyer, *The Five Dollar Day: Labor, Management, and Social Control in the Ford Motor Company, 1908-1921*. Albany, SUNY Press, 1981.

[41]Alberto Minucci, and Saverio, Vertone, *Il Grattacielo nel deserto*, Rome, Riuniti, p. 176.

workers in the city of Turin. It offered salaries and benefits substantially higher than its competition. FIAT enjoyed a special amendment in the national legislation that allowed companies to direct the monies that it would normally pay to social security to their own association. In the early 1960s, FIAT's program, the Mutua Aziendale Lavoratori F.I.A.T. provided general health-care for 250,000 people, 1/4 the population of Turin.

FIAT was also responsible for building housing for its workers and management. These activities, reminiscent of the paternalism in company towns such as Pullman, had the same potential for dominating the workforce.[42] Tenancy in this housing frequently depended on job tenure with the company. Between 1946 and 1962, FIAT was responsible for 1601 units built in conjunction with public housing programs, and for 3,143 units constructed without public contribution. This total of 4,474 units of housing was equal to 28% of the 17,043 units of public housing built under all government programs during this time.[43] In sum, as the French geographer Pierre Gabert described FIAT's relation to the city: "The extraordinary control of FIAT over the Turinese labor market led it naturally to intervene in all aspects of the life of its personnel and to do so by using all its power through the intermediary of its social organizations...."[44]

A fourth element was the lack of any urban planning. This failure was particularly evident in the ring of suburbs around Turin, although it also affected the degraded city center and periphery. In the words of Vertone and Minucci, this

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[42]On Pullman and his city, see Stanley Buder, *Pullman: An Experiment in Industrial Order and Community Planning, 1880-1930,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1967, and Marco Diani, "Pullman City: le tyran en Arcadie" *Milieux,* No. 25, (1986), pp. 48-52.

[43]P. Chicco, M. Garelli, and G. Sirchia, *Sviluppo urbano ed edilizia residenziale pubblica,* Turin, Celid, 1980, pp. 251,275.

[44]Pierre Gabert, *Turin Ville Industrielle,* p. 298.

unregulated immigration, in addition to supplying labor, increased FIAT's standing in the community:

> [The state] allowed the most important phenomenon of these years, immigration, to develop into the most complete and disorganized spontaneity, to give the monopoly of [FIAT] not only an ideal labor market, but also the chance of appearing to public opinion as the only protagonist that acted with any social responsibility.[45]

FIAT's domination of cultural affairs and the sources of information was equally great. *La Stampa*, the Turinese newspaper, was owned by FIAT.[46] Through the paper, FIAT was able to promote its vision of the city, immigration, and the necessity of industrial development.

Labor Movement Responses

The second convergence between automobile cities lies in the unions' response to these problems. Differences between American and Italian unions have traditionally been seen as quite substantial. American unions have been perceived to be more concerned with issues limited to job control and wage increases for their members, whereas Italian unions were concerned with the general welfare of the working class. Yet, in both Detroit and Turin the unions intervened to support minority claims. If the problems posed by the rise of the Fordist city were so daunting, why were the unions' strategic responses so radical and inclusive? To address these problems involved a double leap for the unions: first to represent the interests of the least skilled and those without union backgrounds, that is the immigrants; and second, to extend this representation beyond the factory. Given the unions' traditional reticence regarding involvement in urban politics, compounded by their weakness during this period, these

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[45]Minucci and Vertone, *Il Grattacielo nel deserto*, p. 180.

[46]Even movie theaters and the major hotels in the city were controlled by the company. On the images that FIAT sought to project of the unions and immigrants, see G. Fofi, "Meridionali e settentrionali allo 'Specchio dei tempi'" *Nord e Sud*, August, 1961, and *L'Immigrazione meridionale a Torino*, Milan, Feltrinelli, 1975, pp. 69-71.

activities are particularly striking.[47] The best answer is to see it within the logic of the incentives that union leadership faces in responding to claims on the part of its base. This can be seen in the paradox that Alessandro Pizzorno lays out:

> The weaker the union, the more it is likely to accept or to promote conflictual pressures from the base; the stronger the union, the more likely it is to contain them.[48]

The divergences from the national pattern are far more striking for the American case. In the Italian case, the Turinese are more radical than their other Italian counterparts, but the difference is not as great. This Detroit radicalism will be highlighted in two ways: first, by looking at how the Detroit unions represented blacks during the unions' initial mobilization, and second by comparing their influence on the local political agenda with those in Chicago and Los Angeles. Drawing on the work of J. David Greenstone, *Labor in American Politics*, I will argue that single-industry development led Detroit to become the city whose political agenda most closely resembled a European model. The similarities are clearest in the unions efforts to mobilize along the lines of Social Democratic welfare state goals that would benefit non-unionized, lower-class groups as well as their labor constituency, and in unions reaching out to politically mobilize other non-labor minority groups under this banner.[49]

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[47]The general record of unions trying to engage in community politics is not a good one. For some reflections on American unions seeking to engage in community organizing in the 1960s, cf. Derek C. Bok and John T. Dunlop, *Labor and the American Community*, New York, 1970, Chapter 15. On the Italian case, see M. Marcelloni et. al., *Lotte urbane e crisi della società industriale: l'esperienza italiana*, Milan, Savelli, 1981.

[48]Alessandro Pizzorno, "Le due logiche dell'azione di classe" in A. Pizzorno, E. Reynieri, M. Regini, I. Regalia, *Lotte Operaie e sindacato: il ciclo 1968-1972*, Bologna, Il Mulino, pp. 24-25.

[49]J. David Greenstone, *Labor in American Politics*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1977, p. 361.

DETROIT IN THE 1940S

In the 1930s, when industrial unions were founded, American labor was weak at the moment that in David Brody's words, it was an "arrested movement".[50] The strategies of organizing craft unions, developed by the American Federation of Labor (AFL), had failed to provide a base for American unions to respond to the challenge of large factories. Only when the Congress on Industrial Organizations (CIO) broke off from the AFL in 1935, was there the possibility to organize the automobile industry. Previous to this period, the unions had no effective factory organization and they were not recognized by the employers.

There was no labor party to support its endeavors to organize and the Democratic party was a reluctant ally.[51] Indeed, so unresponsive had the national state been in the 19th Century to labor's demands, that the labor movement responded with a politics of voluntarism. The unions fear that any legislation would be turned against them led them to not ask the state to provide any general social benefits.[52] These difficulties were compounded in Detroit by the paternalism discussed above and the repression in the factories. The most effective and the uniquely American techniques were the presence

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[50]David Brody, *Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the 20th Century Struggle*, New York, Oxford, 1981, p. 82.

[51]Mike Davis "Why the U.S. Working Class is Different" *New Left Review*, Sept-Oct 1980.

[52]Michael Rogin, "Voluntarism: The Political Functions of an Anti-Political Doctrine," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 15 (July 1962), 534-535.

of massive spy operations inside the factories. Between 1934 and 1936, General Motors spent over $1,000,000 for these purposes.[53]

The United Automobile Workers (UAW) faced a particularly difficult time in representing the claims of Detroit blacks. In the 1940s, organizing blacks was crucial to the UAW's organizing strategy, particularly at Ford, where they constituted a high percentage of the unskilled labor. As a result of Ford's paternalistic relations with the black community, and the union's previous ambivalence towards organizing them, blacks had been reluctant to support the union. Ford was the only major automobile company to hire blacks in large numbers. Unlike other companies, Ford hired blacks on the recommendations of the clergy. Indeed, it became impossible for a black to be hired without such a recommendation from either a minister or a prominent community leader. This policy gave Ford considerable leverage over these ministers, who were among the most important community leaders. The threat to cease hiring from a particular minister frequently sufficed to secure compliance with Ford's policies, particularly those concerning unions.[54] It also gave Ford substantial influence over the community as a whole. The 10 to 12,000 blacks in Ford's employment, coupled with their families, meant that virtually one quarter of the city's black population was benefitting from his policies. Ford also supported black philanthropy, and established secure relations with the most prominent black leaders and clergy. As a result, the black community in Detroit was as anti-union as any community in the country.[55]

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[53]Sidney Fine, *SIT-DOWN: The General Motors Strike of 1936-1937*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1969, p. 38. For an organizer's view of how spying and intimidation affected the organizing campaigns, see Victor C. Reuther, *The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UAW/A Memoir*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1979, pp. 197-199. See also Irving Howe and B.J. Widick, *The UAW and Walter Reuther*, New York, Random House, 1949. For a systematic recounting of the depth of repressive comany policies, see Joel Aberbach, *Labor and Liberty: The La Follette Committee and the New Deal*, Indianapolis, 1966.

[54]Meier and Rudwick, pp. 8-11.

[55]Harvard Sitkoff, *A New Deal for Blacks The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue: Volume 1, The Depression Decade*, Oxford, Oxford University Press,

Gaining black support required the unions to represent black claims in the community as well as the factory. In the organizing of both Chrysler and Ford, union leaders convinced black leaders that black support was necessary to avert civil disturbances. To maintain black support after they won a union shop, the unions were pressured to respond to blacks' major grievance, their having been restricted to the most dangerous and dirty jobs within the plant. Blacks demanded that they be upgraded into more skilled and semi-skilled jobs. Yet unions' capacities to support these claims were weak. Many white workers, even those who were supporters of the United Automobile Workers (UAW), resisted this change. Throughout World War II, white workers carried out "hate strikes" against the upgrading of blacks within the factory.[56]

The community proved to be an easier place in which to consolidate this alliance. War-time Detroit was an extremely congested, conflictual environment. The slow decline in center-city population, which had started in the early 1920s, had been reversed by the immense infusion of laborers into Detroit to work for the war effort. Three hundred thousand whites and fifty thousand blacks had poured into Detroit in the early years of the war.[57] Whereas white ethnic groups in Detroit had moved into more class homogeneous areas throughout the city, blacks were still restricted to a ghetto on the east side, the most densely populated and least sanitary part of the city. Despite the pressure of increased population, there was no area into which they could relocate. Private real estate covenants were established such that white owners were forbidden to sell to blacks. Those blacks who did move into white neighborhoods encountered

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1981, p. 184. The Detroit chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Urban League were far less supportive of the CIO organizing drives than were the national organizations. Meier and Rudwick, pp. 8, 28, 29, 58.

[56]Meier and Rudwick, Chapter 3.

[57]See also D.R. Deskins, Jr. *Residential Mobility of Negroes in Detroit, 1837-1865*, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan, Department of Geography, Michigan Geographical Publication, n. 5.

physical resistance. Black houses had frequently been bombed in the 1920s.[58] The suburbanization and movement to live near available jobs that occurred in Italy and amongst white ethnic groups in Detroit was not allowed to occur for black residents of Detroit.

The housing tensions came to a head in 1942 when the federal government, with the support of the local black community and influential white liberals, sought to open public housing for black workers--the Sojourner Truth Housing Project, just north of a major Polish enclave in an autonomous city called Hamtramck. When blacks tried to move in, whites led by the Ku Klux Klan attacked them and prevented their entrance. In the ensuing melee, hundreds of blacks fought against the mob of whites and the police. The tensions that accumulated both in and out of the factories were evident for anyone who wanted to see them.[59] When the inevitable city-wide riot did occur, precipitated by an episode at an amusement park, it cost twenty-five black lives, and it was only settled three days later when federal troops were called in.

Throughout these conflicts, the UAW was the one important city-wide organization to support the black community. It campaigned for black rights to fair housing and forcefully criticized police brutality in handling the riots. Through its support, the UAW forged an alliance with the black community that would survive until the early 1960s. This support of blacks in the community was critical precisely because the UAW was unable to overcome white racism and upgrade black workers in the factory.[60] These racial antagonisms felt among the union membership were constant

[58]Zunz, *The Changing Face of Inequality*, p. 374.

[59]The account taken from Chapter 4 of Meier and Rudwick. A *Life* magazine article at the time warned "Detroit is Dynamite" --it "can either blow up Hitler or it can blow up the U.S. "Detroit is Dynamite", *Life* 13 (August 17, 1942) cited in August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, *Black Detroit and the Rise of the UAW*, New York, Oxford University, Press, p. 192.

[60]Meier and Rudwick, 187. See also David Brody, *Workers in Industrial America: Essays on the 20th Century Struggle*, New York, Oxford, 1981, p. 216.

throughout the history of the automobile union. They forced the UAW to organize as broadly as possible and to make its representative claims as universal as possible. As Greenstone puts it:

> In order to overcome this bitter management opposition the union had to quell racial and ethnic hostility within its own ranks, as well as conflicts between skilled and unskilled workers. UAW leaders therefore appealed for solidarity based on their common status as industrial workers.[61]

DETROIT, CHICAGO, AND LOS ANGELES

The values and alliances of the organizing period shaped labor politics in Detroit for a generation to come. The UAW could direct its members to support candidates for their adherence to welfare state principles. This agenda continued to dominate the politics of Detroit, albeit in attenuated forms, until the early 1960s. Even as its original radical views moderated, the UAW showed a commitment to black representation and to a class-conscious or welfare state agenda that far exceeded that of unions in other American cities. In Los Angeles and Chicago, unions and the labor movement had a far smaller role in shaping political agendas. In these cities, even substantial numbers of union members did not permit labor to move the Democratic party's political agenda from its more pluralist, patronage-oriented goals. These differences can be seen in the influence that the AFL-CIO sponsored Committee on Political Education (COPE) has exerted on the Democratic party.

These differences are explicable in terms of the concentration of workers and in the legacy of the political machine.[62] The effects of the single industry are seen most clearly in the comparison of Detroit with Los Angeles; and the importance of the political machine in the comparison with Chicago. In Detroit, the unions, through their

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[61]Greenstone, *Labor in American Politics*, pp. 116-117.

[62]Political machines are a product of the national patterns of state formation, and as such, are historically prior to the events that concern the formation of the automobile city. See Martin Shefter, "Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy", *Politics and Society*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1976.

involvement in the Committee on Political Education (COPE) found themselves the dominant partners in local and state wide political coalitions.[63]

If the American labor movement's weakness are found in the transiency, fragmentation and social diversity of the working class, then Los Angeles is the most American of cities. Social disorganization and rapid geographic mobility have taken their toll on the building of stable party organization. The political involvement of trade unions has tended to be sporadic and more oriented to goals affecting single unions.

The balance within the labor movement made it difficult for industrial workers to dominate the COPE agenda. Industrial workers of the CIO, who were the most militant of American workers, made up only 16% of the city wide labor councils. The other 84% were made up of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) unions, which were more politically conservative. In Chicago, the CIO component was 33%, and in Detroit, with the prevalence of the UAW, it was an overwhelming proportion. In Detroit and its surrounding Wayne County there were 200,000 United Automobile Workers (UAW) members out of a 1960 population of 2,666,297. In Chicago and Cook County, there were approximately 65,000 to 70,000 members of each the UAW and the United Steel Workers of America out of a total population of 5,129,725.[64]

Even this low membership figure over-emphasized the CIO's impact in Los Angeles. Many of these unions were scattered throughout the city. These factories were also branch plants of national companies and looked to their national unions to provide political guidance. In the few cases were there large factories that could produce solidary incentives amongst workers, workplace politicization was low. Indeed, from the standpoint of industrial organization, Los Angeles represents the antithesis of Detroit,

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[63]On the UAW's takeover of Michigan's Democratic party, cf. Fay Calkins, *The CIO and the Democratic Party*, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1955.

[64]Greenstone, p. 192.

where the growth of the automobile industry had produced large factories and a militant workplace culture.

Under these conditions, issueless electoral politics frequently emerged. The personality of the candidate, and political connections that he could develop, accounted far more for his election than did adherence to a general welfare state agenda. Once in office, officials responded to particularist claims on their attention. The unions' participation in California state politics conformed to the rules of the game. They sought only to influence the legislature, as did any other interest group, avoiding ideological issues and not pushing a general social welfare program.

In Chicago, a powerful political machine, deeply entrenched in the neighborhoods, resisted COPE's entrance into local politics. The machine had its own agenda, which did not include promoting a broad alliance around welfare-state goals. In Greenstone's understated language, there was in Chicago a "subtle and often unacknowledged indifference among party leaders to any general social principles whatever".[65] Leaders of political machines maintained their power by using patronage to recruit precinct workers and distributing individual favors to voters. The party was not interested in maximizing votes and voters. As long as its candidates won, it had no interest in increasing votes for a general agenda of social change.[66]

The lack of a machine in Detroit was a mixed blessing for the labor unions. It facilitated labor's takeover of the Michigan Democratic party, but it weakened labor's capacity to build alliances between blacks and labor in city politics.[67] The primary

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[65]Greenstone, p. 83.

[66]Political precincts in South Chicago dominated by machines tended to have lower voting turn-outs than those of non-machine leaders. Kornblum, *Blue Collar Community*, pp. 157-158. In some cases, the party refused to allocate resources out to marginal districts where they might have made a greater difference. Greenstone, p. 87.

[67]Meier and Rudwick argue that the commonality of interests between blacks and labor should have pushed these two groups to support similar mayoral candidates during the late 1930s and 1940s. For a more detailed examination of the early elections, cf.

reason was that without party affiliation whites would not vote for blacks.[68] Second, even under the most favorable conditions COPE could never match the machine, with its patronage power, in mobilizing the electorate. The machine defeated the Chicago industrial unions' efforts to press for a welfare-state agenda. Just as in Los Angeles, the results were a politics based more on coalition and personal networks than a principled alliance seeking to mobilize broad coalitions.

These contrasts between Detroit and the other two cities, like the story of the UAW's support of blacks in the 1940s, show the depth and the uniqueness of the UAW's commitment to representing a broad constituency in areas outside the workplace. In cases where there was no single-industry, the unions could not push this broad, inclusive vision of minority and then class representation onto the political agenda.

TURINESE LABOR RADICALISM

Turinese unions showed a similar commitment to representing immigrant claims in a class-conscious manner outside the workplace. The logic of their interest is also born out of weakness. Italian unions in the 1960s confronted difficulties similar to American unions in the 1930s. They had weak organization on the shop floor, and no capacities for national collective bargaining with employers. They were deeply divided internally between the three competing confederations, and the largest union, the CGIL, was tied to a political party that had not been in power since the coalition governments after World War II and was not likely to govern at the national level in the foreseeable

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Kathleen Gilley, "Class and Party in Detroit: The UAW and the 1937 Municipal Election". M.A. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1979.

[68]Greenstone, p. 124.

future.[69] At the time Italian unions did organize, they also faced competition from extraparliamentary groups to their left.[70]

In Turin, these problems were compounded by the difficulties that FIAT presented. Through the higher wages it could pay and its own miniature welfare state, it offered a higher standard of living than any other employer. It bitterly opposed those who sought to organize a union. Workers were arbitrarily moved, demoted, or fired for union activities. FIAT maintained an extensive security force, with one officer [*sorvegliante*] for every forty workers, with the intent of harassing organizers.[71] Workers who signed up to run *consigli interni* on the FIOM slate put their jobs at risk. In the mid-1950s union militants were assigned to special factories, where they were isolated from any contact with other workers.[72]

Just as in Detroit, where organizing the union required representing the claims of black migrants, so too, in Turin did organizing the metal-workers require a coalition between skilled Northern workers and unskilled Southern migrants.[73] The unions' demands of equal wage increases for all and of decreasing the skill divisions within the factory represented the interests of unskilled workers. The unions also supported immigrant workers' demands outside the factory. The first local general strike for

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[69]Allessandro Pizzorno, "I sindacati nel sistema politico italiano: aspetti storici" in *I soggetti del pluralismo: Classi Partiti Sindicati*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1980, p. 135.

[70]On the relations between the parties and the extraparliamentary groups, see Luigi Bobbio, *Lotta Continua: Storia di una Organizzazione Rivoluzionaria*, Savelli, 1979 and Alessandro Pizzorno, "Le due logiche dell'azione di classe" in A. Pizzorno, E. Reynieri, M. Regini, I. Regalia, *Lotte Operaie e sindacato: il ciclo 1968-1972*, Bologna, Il Mulino.

[71]Giovanni Carocci, *Inchiesta alla Fiat: Indagine su taluni aspetti della lotta di classe nel complesso Fiat*, Florence, Parenti, 1957, pp. 132-152.

[72]See accounts in Pugno and Garavini, pp. 67 f.

[73]The constructing of this alliance and the general rebuilding of the Turinese unions was a process that took the better part of the 1960s. The best short summary in English is Charles Sabel, *Work and Politics: The Division of Labor in Industry*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982, 145-167.

housing reform, the precursor to the national strike in the Fall of 1969, was held in Turin. Turinese unions and left-wing parties were far more likely than those in other cities to represent radical social demands or to attempt to mediate disputes between industrial workers and other lower class social groups. Their motives were to prevent conflict between different sectors of the working class and to avoid letting their militant base get too far ahead of them. Housing occupations were a good example of the former. In Turin, throughout the period of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Southern immigrants who worked in factories were without adequate housing. They occupied public housing intended primarily for other workers, who objected to their potential loss. At critical moments, the unions stepped in and mediated the conflicts between the occupiers, the intended occupants, and the city.[74]

It was *autoriduzione*, the refusal to pay government mandated increases in service costs, that most clearly showed how much more willing the Turinese unions were to support grass-roots militancy than any other unions. This initiative developed in Turin; and, of all the major federations in the country, the Turinese were its firmest and at times its only supporters.[75] The reasoning of the Turinese union leaders for their openness to these tactics shows the effects of their environment on their politics:

> The second condition [peculiar to Turin] is that the union is yet to become a mass organization. The membership of the F.L.M (the Metalworkers Union) hovers around 30%, ... Also, the political parties in Turin have a very weak presence in the factories and in the schools. This state of affairs requires the Turinese union to be more attentive to what happens inside the mass movements in order to make the appropriate decisions to unify the organization and the movement.[76]

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[74]Ted Perlmutter, "Occupied Housing in Turin: The Role of Outside Organizers" paper presented at the American Sociological Association Meeting, Washington D.C., August 25 - 29, 1985.

[75]For a description of the diverse union positions, see Alemannni, et. al., (ed.) *Autoriduzione: cronache e riflessioni di una lotta operaia e popolare settembre/dicembre 1974*, Milano, Sapere, 1975.

[76]Alemannni *et al, p.* 28. For evidence that the local Communist Party felt hostage to the same pressures, see "Viaggio attraverso gli umori del PCI: Torino, I compagni fra l'auto e la curia", *Corriere della Sera*, December 6, 1974.

In the language of Pizzorno, these were the most Italian of the Italian federations, the weakest of the weak seeking to mobilize the most volatile and politically repressed of the Italian workforce. As such, the Turinese experience mirrored the experience of Detroit in the 1930s.

Political Space and Social Time

The model suggests a pattern of development characteristic of cities organized around an automobile industry. The rapid, unrestrained urban development concomitant with the "take-off" process of an automobile industry produced a volatility that led to protests, civil disturbances, and riots and forged cities without adequate housing or social services. It also required those unions and parties that would lead a labor movement to be more responsive to the claims of the most recently arrived and the most disadvantaged. This is most clearly seen during the time of union mobilization. In neither case would it have been possible to organize a movement without representing the unskilled and the immigrants.

Turin's "American" style of urban development, with a small central business district, an immigrant ghetto in the center of the city, and public housing projects within the city limits, meant that the claims that in other Italian were peripheral both substantively and geographically were instead incorporated into Turinese politics. In Detroit, the adherence to an ideology of representing industrial workers and the strategy of reaching out to other lower class constituencies meant that unions supported groups and issues that would have not been represented in Los Angeles and Chicago. Union support for blacks as a group in the 1940s is the clearest evidence of this difference. Political machines of this era tended to subordinate black interests when they represented them at all.[77]

[77]For the early period, see Ira Katznelson, *Black Men, White cities: Race, Politics, and Migration in the United States, 1900-30, and Britain, 1948-68*, Chicago, University of Chicago, 1973. For the latter see Greenstone, pp. 248-249. Ironically, it was the

These convergences between Fordist cities are not to suggest that the experiences were identical, merely comparable. These movements also had a greater effect on national politics in Italy than they did in the United States. Italian labor unions maintain a much greater class consciousness than the United States. The differing trajectories of the movements are also influenced by the different periods of "social time" in which they occurred. Broadly speaking, one might say that if the local, spatial parallels make the cases comparable, then the disjunctions in timing help to account for their differences. In Europe in general and in Italy in particular, changes in the recognition of labor as a political actor and in the organization of the workplace compress into the era following World War II processes that in the United States had begun in the 1910s.[78] The Taylorist breakdown of tasks within the factories theorized by Antonio Gramsci in his writings on "Americanism and Fordism" in the 1920s did not occur until the mid-1950s.[79]

The rapidity of these processes in Italy meant that when they occurred that they would be all the more explosive. It also meant that industrial workers would be organizing at the factory level at the same time as the student movements occurred.[80]

UAW's decreasing sensitivity to community issues, particularly police brutality and open housing that led blacks to challenge the UAW leadership in the 1960s. Greenstone, pp. 256-258.

[78]Bruno Trentin, "Il sindacato e i problemi della città industriale" in Clara Cardia *et. al.*, *La città e la crisi del capitalismo*, Rome, Laterza, 1970, pp. 167-168.

[79]Antonio Gramsci, "Americanismo e Fordismo" *Quaderni di Carcere*, Vallentino Gerratura (ed.), Turin, Einaudi, 1975. pp. 2136-2181. For a description of these events, see Giuseppe Berta, "Il neocapitalismo e la crisi delle organizzazioni di classe", in Aldo Agosti and Gian Mario Bravo, *Storia del movimento operaio, del socialismo e delle lotte sociali in Piemonte*, Bari, De Donato, 1981, pp. 123-172.

[80]For example, see Sidney Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy 1965-1975* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), and Robert Lumley, *States of Emergency: Cultures of Revolt in Italy from 1969 to 1978* (London: Verso, 1990). On the nuances of the development of this relationship within one extraparliamentary group, see my "Common and Uncommon Sense: The Rise and Fall of Student-Worker Politics in *Lotta Continua*" (Paper submitted to *Theory and Society*). On the difficulties of creating an alliance between radical blacks and an already entrenched union movement, see James

The combination of the two meant that the Italian movements of the 1960s would have a greater impact than did either the union mobilization of the 1930s or the student movements of the 1960s in the United States.

A. Geschwender, *Class, Race, and Worker Insurgency: The League of Revolutionary Black Workers*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Table 1 Employment in the Manufacturing Industry of the Metropolitan Area in Turin (1951-1977)[81]

Percentage Variation

	1961/1951 (a)	1971/1961 (a)	1977/1971 (b)	1977/1951
Turin	34.7	-6.2	-11.4	11.9
1st Ring	90.9	128.8	-3.6	320.9
2nd Ring	28.7	83.7	33.5	215.6
Total area	41.3	22.4	-4.9	64.5

(a) census data

(b) IRES data.

Table 2: Percentage of Employment

	Census Data			IRES Data	
	1951	1961	1971	1971	1977
Turin	80.4	76.6	58.7	59.9	55.8
1st Ring	12.5	16.9	31.5	30.9	31.3
2nd Ring	7.1	6.5	9.8	9.2	12.9
Tot. area	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

[81]Tables taken from Danielle Ciravegna "Struttura ed evoluzione dell'occupazione industriale e terziaria nell'area metropolitana torinese (1951-1977) in Enrico Luzzati, *La Rilocalizzazione del'industria nell'area torinese (1961-1977)*, Progetto Torino, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1982, p. 57.

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